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Developing countries  have traditionally relied on public ownership  and bureaucratic
control for the provision of telecommunications  services, power, water, railroads, roads,
port  services, and gas.  This preference is now being reversed.  An increasing  nurnber of
developing  countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa are relying  on private  ownership
and regulation  for the provision of such goods and services.  Given that other countries  are
likely to follow  suit, it is important at this juncture  to explore whether this shift in
orientation  is associated  with positive outcomes  for the producers  and consumers,  and to
identify the regulatory  features which contribute to success or failure.
The consequences  of this shift in orientation has been addressed  from  different
perspectives.  For example, Galal et al. (1994) evaluated the welfare effects of divesting  a
dozen enterprises,  mostly in utilities,  in four countries and found beneficial  effects for most
of the actors involved.  Levy and Spiller (1993) analyzed the role of government
commitment  in persuading the private sector to invest in five country case studies,  and
found a positive  association  between both.  Wellenius and Stem (1994) documented the
recent reforms  in the telecommunications  sector in developing  countries, and  described best
practice  solutions.  This paper builds on these studies.  Its main contribution  lies in its
attempt  to empirically explore the relationship between the outcomes  of regulatory  reforms,
regulatory  incentives and government commitment.
l  Ahmed Galal is a senior economist  at the World Bank, Policy Research Department. Bharat Nauriyal
is a consultant at the World Bank, Policy Research Department. The authors received helpful comments from
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Analytically,  we view regulation as a contractual  relationship between the regulated
firm and the regulator.  The government  sets the rules of the game but the firm has private
information about its cost which the regulator cannot observe perfectly.2 Because  the firm
has private  information,  its performance depends  on whether efforts  are made to reduce this
information advantage  or not.  Second, because  some degree of information asymmetry  will
inevitably remain,  the firm's  performance  depends on whether it is provided appropriate
prices to invest and operate efficiently  or not.  Finally, because contracts  are imperfect  and
must be negotiated ex post, 3 the firm's  performance  also depends on the credibility  of
government  commitment with  respect to upholding the terms of the contract.  Failure on the
part of the government/regulators  to reduce the firm's  information advantage, provide
appropriate incentives  (mainly through pricing) to induce the firm to operate efficiently,  and
institute safeguarding  mechanisms  to protect the firm against expropriation of assets will
predictably be associated  with excessive rates of return to the producer, low levels of
private  investment, chronic unmet demand and low productivity.  Consumers  will also  lose.
To explore this proposition, we analyze the recent  regulatory experiences  of seven
developing  countries.  The seven  countries are Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, Malaysia,
Mexico, The Philippines, and Venezuela.  Although we identify the recent trends  in private
sector participation  in monopoly sectors in general, we limit our analysis to the
telecommunications  sector because it is the sector where governments  in developing
countries  have opted to privatize the most.
Our findings  are consistent with the above proposition.  On the one hand, Chile was
the most  successful  in resolving the information and incentive problems through
competition  and benchmark pricing.  It was also the most successful in resolving the
commitment  problem by embodying the regulation in a law, which  is difficult to  change
because  the country's  legislature is divided among multiple parties  and the executive  branch
is unable to change laws at will.  As a result, the producers  and consumers  were better off
2  As elaborated,  for example,  in Besanko and  Sappington (1987), Caillaud,  Guesnerie,  Rey, and Tirole
(1988),  and Grossman and  Hart (1983).
3  As discussed,  for example,  by Hart and Moore (1988),  Hart and Holmstrom  (1987), and  Williamson
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following privatization  and regulation.  On the other hand, the Philippines  was the least
successful  in resolving the information, incentives or commitment problems.  Consequently,
and despite  over four decades of private  sector involvement, the telecom  sector continues  to
suffer from  serious under investment and low productivity.  In the remaining  countries, the
picture  is mixed, as are the results.
These findings have important policy implications,  which are offered at the end of
the paper.  Below,  we first  elaborate the analytical framework.  In section III, we assess  the
regulatory  regimes in our sample countries with a view to evaluating  the extent to which
they deviated from recommended  solutions.  In section IV, we contrast our assessment  of
the regulatory  regimes with sector performance.  We conclude in section V.
1I. ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK
Following  the incentive literature, we view regulation as a contractual  arrangement
between the regulated firm and regulators.'  The government  sets the regulatory  rules but
the firm has private  information about its cost which cannot be observed  perfectly by the
regulators. 5 Information  asymmetry and  imperfect observability create a divergence  of
interest  between the consumers  and producers, thereby giving rise to  strategic behavior  on
the part of the regulator and regulated firms.  In this setting, the regulator's  first task is to
make the information  problem go away, perhaps by motivating the firm to reveal its
information voluntarily.  Where information asymmetry persists, the regulator's  second task
is to devise an incentive  scheme that simultaneously restricts the firm's  capacity to extract
information rent and persuades  it to operate efficiently.
Another  problem arises because contracts in utilities span a long period of time
during which  unforseen events can occur.  Contingencies to cover these events are difficult
to  identify beforehand and costly to  fully describe in the current contract, creating
uncertainty for the private  sector about how contracts will be renegotiated.  To reduce  this
I This view of regulation differs from the traditional view, which focuses on devising alternative (non-linear)  pricing schemes  to
minimize  distortions resulting  from non-convexities  in the production function.
'  Caillaud, Guesnerie,  Rey, and Tirole (1988), and Besanko and Sapppington (1987), survey the theory of regulation under
incomplete information.Galal & Naunyal  4
uncertainty  and its attendant  strategic behavior on the part of the firm, the third task for the
government/regulators  is to explicitly  specify how conflicts will be resolved in the future,
who will enforce their resolutions, and how the regulatory  rules will be insulated  form
arbitrary political  interventions.
In sum, regulation is likely to be most effective if it is designed to: (1) motivate  the
firm to reveal its private  information, (2) induce the firm to operate  efficiently,  and (3)
convince  the firm that the government will not expropriate its assets or quasi-rents  in the
future.  Drawing  on a vast literature, we elaborate how these conditions  can be met below.
11.1.  Information
Motivating  the firm to reveal its information can be achieved to some degree  in a
variety  of ways.  These include  outright competition,  competition  by comparison,  auctions
and a sort of market contestability  (discussed below).  Competition  provides the least costly
solution to the information asymmetry  problem.  In telecommunications,  the room  for
potential competition  has increased  significantly in recent years due to technological
progress.  For example, it is now possible to engage a number of suppliers  in providing
such services as long-distance phone  calls, cellular phone calls and a variety  of value-added
services (e.g., data transmission,  facsimile).  A similar possibility presents  itself in
electricity  generation, where competition  is also feasible among generating companies.
Where technology  does not permit  competition (because of economies  of scale,  for
example, in the provision  of basic telephone services), competition  by comparison  can be a
useful way to reduce the firm's  information advantage.  The participation of multiple
suppliers  in the same country (even if each supplier is a regional monopoly)  makes it
possible  for the regulator to compare performance across firms.  Barring collusion between
them, this possibility provides the regulator with a mechanism to verify the information
provided by each firm and to gather information about the influence of a common
environmental  parameter (e.g., weather) on the relative performance  of firms.
Third, requiring bidding for the right to provide a service is another  information
extracting  mechanism.  Auction  can aid the regulators to identify the most efficient  potential
supplier, and  simultaneously limit information rent.  Thus, even if the potential producersGalal & Naunyal  5
have private  knowledge  of their likely production  costs and the regulator  wishes to select a
single firm to serve as the sole producer of a commodity (e.g., basic telephony),  the
government  can link the compensation rules  under the franchise to the winning  bid.  One
way of doing  so is to indicate that a low winning bid will be interpreted  as a prediction that
production  costs are likely to be high.  To protect the winning  bidder against the prospect
of high cost realizations,  the government can announce that it will share the additional
costs.  Laffont and Tirole (1986), McMee  and McMillan (1987), and Riordan and
Sappington (1987)  argue that this linkage will promote more aggressive bidding.
Finally, much like bidding before the contract is granted, the threat of competition
after the contract is granted can also serve to limit the producer's  capacity to extract
information rent.  A firm such as a basic telephone provider that faces no potential
competition  once it is selected may have a strong incentive to inflate production  costs or to
reduce the quality of its services.  Given that exit and entry are costly, these perverse
incentives  may be mitigated  somewhat if the regulation embodies provisions that ensure
that an alternative producer can be called upon to replace the incumbent if the latter fails to
meet  certain performance  conditions (Demski et al., 1987; Nalebuff and  Stiglitz,  1983).
11.2 Price regulation and Incentives
Where monopoly situations are unavoidable, price regulation is necessary to allow
the firm to make a fair rate of return and to protect the consumers.  Prices  can be regulated
using rate of return regulation, price cap regulation or benchmark  regulation.  Each of these
pricing  schemes has its own incentive properties. 6 Under rate of return regulation,  prices
are set so that the firm can recover its costs and make a fair rate of return.  Where the
regulators  are unable to identify the rate base appropriately (allowable fixed costs), this
scheme  induces firms to inflate costs, invest excessively, and engage in cross subsidization
by shifting costs from unregulated to regulated services.
6  These properties  have been discussed at length elsewhere. See for instance, Brown et al. (1991),
Einhom (1991), and Schmalensee  (1989).Galal  & Nauriyal  6
Under price  cap regulation (also referred to as RPI-X  regulation), a ceiling is
imposed on the average tariff increase  for a pre-specified basket of services in which  the
firm has a monopoly.  The average price increases will not exceed the Retail Price Index
minus a number X that is predetermined  for a given period  of time.  To the extent  that the
X factor is positive, this  scheme will transfer to consumers  the benefits from technological
progress  and improved productivity.  Because it is set independent of the firm's  costs, the
scheme  limits the firm's  opportunity to distort its cost data, or shift the costs of competitive
services onto their captive monopoly activities.  Instead, the firm is motivated to minimize
costs because it can retain  any profits  that may result from cost cutting in the period
between  tariff revisions.  The main shortcoming of this scheme is that it leaves the
determination  of the X factor to the regulators,  which creates uncertainty.  Moreover,  to the
extent that the regulators  keep an eye on the firm's  rate of return, the scheme may
degenerate  to a rate of return regulation.
Finally, under  benchmark  regulation, tariffs are set such that the firm makes a fair
rate of return, but with reference to  some yardstick other than its actual costs.  The
yardstick  can be the cost of an  "'efficient" firm, or the cost of a similar firm.  Because costs
are divorced form  actual costs and because tariffs are revised only  periodically  (say, every
few years),  benchmark  regulation has similar cost saving properties  as those  associated  with
price  cap regulation.  Moreover,  because the scheme explicitly  specifies a fair rate of return,
it has the property of limiting the discretion of the regulators  in setting the X factor as in
price  cap regulation.  The main shortcoming  of this scheme is that disagreements  can arise
with respect to the definition of the benchmark.
II.3 Commitment
Commitment  on the part of the government not to behave opportunistically  can be
strengthened  by specifying clear conflict resolution mechanisms,  entrusting the enforcement
of regulation  to qualified parties, and  insulating the regulatory rules  from arbitrary reversals
by politicians.
Conflict resolution  mechanisms  involve specifying the course of action each party
can take when they disagree.  They are particularly important with respect to prices, theGall  & Nauriyal  7
terms of interconnection  and the rules of entry.'  Resolving conflicts may entail arbitration,
for example, where disagreements  arise over the X factor (assuming the RPI-X formula is
adopted), the calculation of the fair rate of return (if that is followed), or the definition of
the efficient firm (if benchmark regulation is applied). Or it may entail court hearings if
the regulator, consumers or potential competitors  believe that the incumbent behaves in a
way that deters entry.
Establishing conflict resolution mechanisms is only valuable, however, with the
knowledge that these mechanisms will be enforced at a reasonable cost.  The enforcement
of contracts requires identifying a neutral third party, who must have the means to force
each party to respect the agreement,  acquire the information  that both parties posses, and
observe what both parties can observe. In a given country, the choice of a particular
agency or agencies depends on which institution  has (or could have) these qualifications.
In general, the menu of options includes the court system, a regulatory commission, the
executive branch, or arbitration.
Finally, even if conflict resolution mechanisms  and enforcement are sorted out, the
credibility of regulation may be eroded for political  reasons,  especially where the current
administration is not able to bind future ones.  Given that successive  administrations are
likely to have different constituencies,  they may change the regulatory rules for
redistributive purposes rather than efficiency considerations.' To minimize the influence of
politics on regulation, it may be desirable, for example, to stagger the appointment of the
regulators counter cyclical to the political round, establish the regulatory agencies as quasi
judicial entities, or embody the regulation  in a law, especially where laws are difficult to
change.  If all fails, it may be necessary to resort to external guarantees to establish
credibility and attract private investment.
'  The need for conflict  resolution mechanisms  can be reduced  by preventing  conflicts from arising in the
first place.  This can be achieved in part by clearly specifying  the regulatory  rules themselves. For example,
where prices are set on the basis of the RPI-X formula,  the uncertainty  surrounding  the X factor can be
mitigated  by specifying it over a given period of time.
Baron (1988a), for example, shows using a model of imperfect information  and majority rule that the legislators with distributive
preferences may prefer a regulatory  policy that achieves a desired distribution  at the expense of efficiency.  See also Baron (1988b) and
Baron and Besanko (1987).Galal & Naurnyal  8
HI. ASSESSMENT  OF REGULATION:  COMPARATIVE  CASE STUDIES
How closely did each of our sample countries emulate the solutions recommended  in
the previous section to reduce the firm's information  advantage, provide efficiency
enhancing pricing schemes, and offer credible commitment? Before attempting to answer
this question, we first place our sample in the context of the wider phenomenon of
increased private sector participation in monopoly sectors in developing countries.
H1I.1  Recent  trends and sample  countries
Many developing countries are increasingly  replacing public by private monopolies.
Table I displays the magnitude  and sectoral  distribution of the proceeds from divesting
utilities in these countries over the period 1988-92. The magnitude of privatization has
been increasing steadily, totalling nearly $20 billion in sale revenue in just five years.  This
trend can be interpreted as a pragmatic response to the inability of governments to meet
pending demand because of fiscal constraints. It can also be interpreted as a reaction to the
increasing recognition of the perceived (and increasingly  documented) efficiency differential
of private over public management  of assets.  Finally, it can be interpreted as a graduation
of countries to a higher level of economic development,  in which the private sector is now
able to mobilize large savings to undertake lumpy projects.
Table 1. Value of recent infrastructure privatization  in developing  countries
Millions  of  U.S.  Dollars  Percent
Subsector  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  Total  of Total
Telecommunications  325  212  4036  5743  1504  11821  59.70
Power  106  2100  20  346  2726  5299  26.70
Gas Distribution  0  0  0  0  1906  1906  9.60
Railroads  0  0  0  110  217  327  1.60
Roads  0  0  250  0  0  250  1.20
Ports  0  0  0  0  7  7  0.03
Water  0  0  0  0  175  175  0.80
Total  431  2312  4307  6200  6535  19785  100
Telecom & power (%  of total)  100  100  94.1  98.2  64.7  86.5
Source: Sader (1993) as cited in World Development Report, 1994.Galal  & Nauriyal  9
Whatever the interpretation, the bulk of privatization occurred in the
telecommunications  (60 percent)  and power  (27 percent) sectors (table  1).  In contrast,
privatization  was limited in the railroads, roads, ports and water sectors.  We speculate that
this phenomenon  is due in part to labor intensity, for example, in railroads and ports, where
labor opposition  may have prevented  privatization from taking hold.  We also  speculate that
the limited privatization  in water is due in part  to  the fact that tht  provision  oL water
typically  involves a high subsidy, which  governments find difficult to give to the private
sector on political  grounds.
Within the telecommunications  sector, we identified 29 developing  countries  which
shifted from public to private ownership of basic and/or value added telecom  services
between  1989 and  1993.  More countries may have followed suit since.  From this universe,
we selected all the seven countries with private sector participation  in basic telecom
services.  Although  the sample is small and not random, table 2 illustrates that these seven
countries  are diverse in their level of economic development  as measured by their real per
capita GNP, rate of economic growth, initial (1981) level of development of the telecom
sector, the timing  of the regulatory  reform and the extent of divestiture.
Table 2. Sample countries with private sector participation  in telecom
Country  Year of  Share of  GNP  GDP  Years of  Teledensity
Regulatory  Private  Per  growth  Waiting Time
Reform'  Sector  Capita  rate  For Phoneb  (lines per 100
(%, 1993)  ($, 1981)  (1981-92)  people, 1981)
Argentina  1990  100  3442  1.4  4.1  7.7
Chile  1987  100  1995  4.5  5.7  3.4
Jamaica  1988  100  1242  1.9  9.0  2.6
Malaysia  1987  25  2096  6.3  1.6  3.6
Mexico  1990  100  2510  1.4  4.9  4.4
Philippines  1986  100  669  1.2  14.7  0.9
Venezuela  1991  40  3647  2.5  2.5  5.6
a.  Prior reforms were undertaken in Chile (1978, 1982) and Jamaica (1982); additional reforms were
undertaken in Malaysia in 1990.  With the exception of Philippines, where the telecom sector has been
privately owned for decades, and Malaysia, this is also the year of privatization.
b.  As of 1987 for Argentina and 1986 for Jamaica.  Calculated as a ratio of the number of applicants on
waiting list to the average number of main lines added over the last three years.
Sources:  World Development Report 1994, International Telecommunications Union, and Author's search.Galal & Nauriyal  10
I11.2 How  did the sample countries attempt to resolve the information  asymmetry
problem?
Table 3 shows how each country sought to organize the market structure  of its
telecom  sector, award the franchise and achieve some market contestability.  In the market
for basic services, all countries ended up essentially with a monopoly, except  Argentina.
Although  Chile and the Philippines permitted  entry into that market, CTC (in  Chile) and
PLDT (in the Philippines)  maintain a market share of about 95 percent.  Argentina  did
better  by splitting  the market for basic services into two regional monopolies  (one in the
north and another  in the south), which has the potential of aiding the regulators  in verifying
the information provided by each firm.9 In the market for value added services, all
countries,  with the exception of Jamaica, ensured a competitive setting.  Jamaica deviated
from recommended  solutions by providing Cable & Wireless an exclusive  concession  to
provide both basic as well as value added services for a period of 25 years.
Table 3. Information  revealing mechanisms
Market Structure  Bidding/Auctions  Contestability
Country  Basic services  Value added services  (Basic services)  (Basic services)
Argentina  Duopoly^  Competitive  Yes  Partial
Chile  Free entry  Competitive  Yes  Full
Jamaica  Monopoly  Monopoly  No  None
Malaysia  Monopoly  Competitive  No  None
Mexico  Monopoly  Competitive  Yes  Partial
Philippines  Free entryb  Competitive  No  Partial
Venezuela  Monopoly  Competitive  Yes  Partial
a. Regional monopolies, one confined to operations in the North, and the other to the South.
b. While there are about 60 telecom service operators, PLDT the main operator controls 94% of all telephones.
Table  3 also reveals that except for the Philippines,  Malaysia, and Jamaica, all
remaining  countries resorted to international bidding to award the concession.  Argentina,
Chile, Mexico and Venezuela received more than one bid from potential  suppliers,  which
9 The two regional monopolies  in Argentina  were each awarded  a 7 year exclusive  concession  for domestic  basic services  only.
TELMEX in Mexico  was awarded  a 35 year exclusive  concession  for local basic services  but only a 6 year exclusive  concession  for long
distance  services. CANTV  in Venezuela  was given a 30 year concession  with exclusivity  for basic services only for 9 years. In
Malaysia,  STM was given a 20 year exclusive  concession  for provision  of basic services.Galal & Nauriyal  11
suggests that they were able to limit the ability of the selected operator  to extract rents.  In
the Philippines,  PLDT has operated as a private monopoly for decades.  Thus, even if the
initial process  of awarding the license involved bidding, technology  has since changed  so
much that the value of that information to the regulator is likely to have evaporated.  In
Malaysia,  the government  only sold 25 percent of the assets to the private sector.  Inspite of
regulatory  reforms  in  1987, the company's  management  continues to be dominated by the
bureaucracy.  In Jamaica,  Cable & Wireless was operating  in the country at the time  of
privatization  and the government  did not capitalize on the occasion of privatization  to
extract information  from potential  suppliers through bidding.
Finally, table  3 shows that our sample countries varied in the extent  to which  they
introduced  the threat  of competition.  On the one hand, Argentina,  Chile, Mexico, Jamaica,
and Venezuela  all included provisions in the operator's  license, the sector's  regulation  or
the sale contract to  obligate the private operator to meet specific network  expansion and
service quality targets, together  with a provision that failure to meet these obligations  gives
the government  grounds for revoking the concession and awarding it to another supplier.
On the other hand, Malaysia  and the Philippines  did not explicitly  state such a threat  in
their regulatory  framework.
II1.3 How did the sample countries attempt to resolve the pricing problem?
Within the group of countries that adopted a cost saving pricing regime,  Argentina,
Mexico, Venezuela, and Malaysia adopted price cap regulation,  while Chile adopted
benchmark  regulation (table 4).  All 5 countries allow tariffs to be adjusted for inflation.
However,  some did better than others.  For example, tariffs are reviewed less frequently  in
Chile (5 years)  and Mexico (4 years) than in Argentina (semi annual) and Venezuela
(quarterly).  Besides  the disincentive emerging from depriving the firm from reaping
interim benefits from cost savings, frequent revisions of tariffs are costly and cumbersome
to administer.  Chile motivated the firms to operate efficiently  by adopting a pricing scheme
in which tariffs are set for each regulated service on the basis of the incremental costs of an
"efficient" firm.  The resulting prices are then adjusted to ensure that the firms can earn aGalal & Nauriyal  12
fair rate of return on revalued assets, using the capital asset pricing model (as elaborated  in
Box  1 below).
Table 4. Price regulation  in sample countries
Pricing  Frequency of  Inflation  Productivity paramneter/
Country  formula  tariff review  adjustment  Rate of return
Argentina  PC  Semi annual  Indexed to U.S. CPI  X=0%
Chile  BM  Every 5 years  Indexed to CPI  Min. ROA=12%
Jamaica  ROR  Company request  Indexed to CPI  Min. ROE=17.5-20%
Malaysia  PC  Company request  Indexed to CPI  X=0%
Mexico  PC  Every 4 years  Indexed to CPI  X=0% 1990-96; X=3%
after 1998.  1997-98
Philippines  ROR  Company request  None  Max. ROA=12 %
Venezuela  PC  Quarterly  Fully Indexed to WPI  X=O%
until 1996. Partial
Indexation for 1997-2000.
Sources: Hill and Abdala (1994); Galal (1994); Spiller and Sampson (1993); World Bank (1993, 1990); Wellenius
et al. (1994); Esfahani (1994); and Clemente (1994).
The Philippines  and Jamaica followed rate of return regulation, although  in different
forms.  While Jamaica allows for inflation adjustment, the Philippines  is the only country  in
the sample which does not.  Jamaica guarantees the operator net after tax profits within  a
band of  17.5-20% of shareholders equity.  In contrast, the Philippines  leaves price
determination to a Supreme Court ruling that established  a ceiling of 12 % as a fair rate of
return on assets of all utilities.
III.4 How did the sample countries attempt to resolve the commitment problem?
With respect to conflict resolutions,  all countries in the sample anticipated conflicts
over pricing,  entry, and interconnection, and devised rules to deal with them.  The main
difference  lies in the specificity with which the rules were stated.  The degree of specificity
is greatest in Chile and Jamaica, and weakest in Argentina, Malaysia  and Venezuela.
On the one hand, Chile's  regulation defines step by step procedures for arbitration
and appeals.  Disputes between  the firm and regulator over pricing  are resolved through  a
three member  arbitration committee, one member  selected by each party and the third by
mutual agreement.  Disputes over entry are resolved by the anti-trust  commissions, withGalal  & Nauriyal  13
possible  appeal to the Supreme Court.  Disputes over interconnection are subject to binding
arbitration.  Similarly, in Jamaica, conflicts pertaining to tariff adjustments  are subject to
binding arbitration.  In addition,  the operating license explicitly  grants the firm the right to
appeal  any breach  of the terms of the agreement on the part of the government  to the
Supreme Court,  whose ruling can be subjected to review by the Commonwealth Privy
Council in London.
On the other hand, although firms in Argentina have the right to bring disputes
Box  1: Price setting procedus  for fixed telephony  in Chiled
1.  Demand  is first es1riated for  aach  semcotzoneArmt  bundit.
- -2.  ::For.  each  servlce the Incrementw  cost  of develoment is ten  calculated  based  on the concept  of "efficint
- .mf.  .The Incrental-  c,,st:  ofdevlopment  :s noting  but the tong-run  margina  cost (LRMC)  a#usted for
-invesment: The:  aw defins.the  e,,nt  flina  tocne  that statsfrorm scratch nd  euss  only the assets
necessary  to provide.  that-  servIc.  ft  further  stipulates  that,  regulated  cornpanies  have  to have  a minimum  of 5-
year investnt  am,  by the copany: and  preented  to SUBTEL  ffbEwing  the  detailed  outin:
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Source:  Galal  (1994)
concerning  pricing, entry, or interconnection to the attention of the newly established
regulatory  agency (CNT), the latter's  decisions can only be appealed to the minister  of
economy.  In Malaysia,  conflicts are first referred to the regulatory  agency, beyond whichGalal  & Nauriyal  14
the procedure  is not well defined, often revolving around ad hoc procedures  that culminate
in decisions by the minister.  In Venezuela, disputes over interconnection  are resolved
through  arbitration at the request of either  party without further appeal.  However, disputes
regarding tariffican  only be brought to the attention of the regulatory  agency  (CONATEL),
beyond  which it is unclear  what recourse the company has.
In the Philippines, there is an explicit procedure to appeal to the Supreme Court  to
restrain regulatory  discretion  and resolve conflicts over tariffs, entry and interconnections.
However,  because the regulatory rules  themselves are not clearly defined, the appeal
process lacks the basis on which to make such appeals.  Nowhere is this more apparent
than in price regulation,  where only a ceiling on the rate of return is set without explicit
provisions  for inflation adjustment.
With respect to enforcement,  table  5 characterizes the enforcing agencies  in the
sample countries in terms of their neutrality, power of enforcement and capacity to process
the information.  Neutrality  is assured when the enforcing agencies are independent  of the
bureaucracy or known for independence  in the case of the courts.  Enforcement  power is
assumed to exist when the agencies have the right to request the needed information  from
the firm and to implement the resolutions once reached.  Finally, needed skills are assumed
to exist when the agency can attract skilled employees or hire consultants when needed.
Table 5. Enforcing  agencies, their neutrality, enforcement  power, and skills
Country  Agency (s)  Neutrality  Enforcement power  Skills
Argentina  CNT, Minister of economy  Lacking  Yes  Moderate
Chile  SUBTEL, Anti trust commissions,
courts, arbitration  Assured  Yes  Strong
Jamaica  MPU, courts, inl. Commonwealth  Assured  Yes  Moderate
Malaysia  JTM, Minister concemed  Lacking  Yes  Moderate
Mexico  SCT  Lacking  Yes  Moderate
Philippines  NTC/DOTC, courts  Lacking  No  Weak
Venezuela  CONATEL, undefined  Lacking  Yes  Moderate
CNT: Comision Nacional de Telecomunicaciones; SUBTEL: Subsecretaria de Telecomunicaciones (Ministry);
MPU: Minister of Public Utilities; JTM: Jabatan Telekom Malaysia; SCT: Secretaria de Comunicaciones y
Transportes; NTC/DOTC: National Telecommunications Commission and Department of Transport and
Communications; CONATEL: Consejo Nacional de Telecomunicaciones.Galal & Nauriyal  15
Our judgement  is that only Chile and Jamaica were  able to assure neutrality  of the
enforcing  agencies.  In Chile, neutrality is derived from relying on multiple  agencies  to
resolve conflicts,  and on the reputation  for independence of the court system.  '  In Jamaica,
Spiller and  Sampson (1993) argue for neutrality on the grounds of court independence,  with
the ultimate  appeal  to the Commonwealth Council in London serving  as a deterring factor
against government  opportunistic  behavior.  In all other cases, the regulatory  agencies  are
extensions of the bureaucracy, with the concerned minister having the final say when
conflicts  arise.  The minister may of course attempt to balance the interests  of the producers
and consumers,  but there are no guarantees of such behavior.
All but two countries in the sample have empowered their regulatory  agencies  with
the authority  to request the necessary information  from the firms and to enforce  the
regulation.  The first exception is the Philippines, where the presence  of two agencies  with
vaguely  defined mandates  may have undermined  their power.  Malaysia is another
exception  in that the company is still publicly  owned in large measure, which  places the
power  of enforcement  with the bureaucracy."
Finally, it appears that the regulatory agencies  are generally at a disadvantage
compared  with regulated  firms, in large measure because they are unable to attract and
retain  skilled employees  due to low civil service compensations.  However,  Chile, Mexico
and Argentina  were able to reduce the skill gap by relying on consultants to prepare  or
review the proposals, for example, for tariff revisions.  On the other hand, CONATEL  in
Venezuela  was more than burdened by the need to review tariffs quarterly.  As a result, the
tariff  increases promised to the firm have been delayed from taking effect in  1993.
Finally, our sample countries  attempted, with varying degrees of success, to insulate
their regulation  from arbitrary  changes arising from political  turnovers.  Once again, Chile
and  Jamaica seem to have succeeded the most.  Chile resolved this problem by enacting its
regulation in a detailed law, which  includes specific provisions for tariff  formulation and
10  Galal (1994)  reaches the conclusion  of court neutrality  on the basis of a study of court rulings  over the past 40 years. See also
Shugart  and Carey (1992) on the nature of goveming  in Chile.
"  Although  JTM (of Malaysia)  is modeled  after OFTEL  in the U.K., and headed by a Director  General,  the minister  still approves all
tariffs and licensing  decisions. Tariffs have not changed  since 1985,  although  the company  is allowed  to adjust them for inflation  under
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interconnection  as well as for the procedures to settle disputes.  Because the country has a
long history  of split legislature and the executive branch hardly ever rules  by a majority,
laws are difficult  to change.  Moreover,  the judicial  system and constitution  historically
upheld private property rights,  for example, against nationalization  during the Allende
administration  in the early seventies and land expropriation in the sixties.  In Jamaica,  the
commitment  problem was resolved  differently.  The regulatory regime  was incorporated  in
an explicit license  that stipulated a specific rate of return and other terms of operations  as
well as the conditions under which both parties (firm and regulator) can change the license.
To make reneging costly for the government, it was stipulated that any rulings by the
Supreme Court  in Jamaica would be subject to review by the Commonwealth  Privy Council
in London.  The merit of this process  stems from the fact that laws can be overturned  in
Jamaica's  parliamentary  system, as new administrations  enjoy a majority in congress.
The case of Philippines, on the other hand, illustrates how politics can erode the
credibility  of regulation.  Between  1972 and  1986, the power of governing was
concentrated  in the executive branch with a few constraints  on administrative  discretion.
Similarly, the independence  of the judiciary  was compromised  because the president was
empowered to remove any judge.  As a result, the ruling elite could not conunit  itself to
hold  to certain policies and to rule out opportunistic behavior  (Esfahani,  1994).  After  1985,
although the political  patrons of the elite controlling PLDT were  thrown out of power, this
elite has nevertheless  retained enough clout through political  institutions  so as to maintain
the status quo.
In Mexico, Argentina  and Venezuela, it is not clear how the problem  of insulating
the regulation from  political changes was resolved.  All three countries have a presidential
system, in which the executive often enjoys a majority in congress.  Moreover,  in
Venezuela and Argentina, the legislature refused to ratify a law to establish CNT and
CONATEL  (the regulatory  agencies),  which compelled the use of decrees by the executive.
These decrees can likewise be revoked by the executive.  Accordingly,  whatever  insulation
was provided,  it did not originate from the political institutions  and the court system.
Alternative  explanations  have been advanced.  In Mexico, Cowhey (1994) argues
that the credibility  of upholding the agreement with the foreign consortia that purchasedGalal & Nauriyal  17
TELMEX stems  from the government's  concern  for the country's  reputation and the
success  of its economic reform program  in the wake of the debt crisis and drop in oil prices
in the late eighties.  The signing of the NAFTA agreement with the U.S. and Canada  may
have served to strengthen the credibility of this  commitment.  In Argentina,  Hill and Abdala
(1994) argue that the privatization and regulation of ENTEL was viewed by the government
as a catalyst for the success of the stabilization program enacted to fight hyperinflation  in
the eighties.  A similar argument  applies to Venezuela, although reforms  have not gone  as
far in this country as they did in Argentina and  Mexico.  While these explanations are
plausible,  their effect  may be limited to discouraging  governments  from reneging  on their
promises  in the short run, leaving open the longer run possibilities.
Malaysia presents  a unique case because the regulatory  and ownership  functions  are
still exercised  by the government, albeit by different members of the bureaucracy.
Accordingly,  the credibility  of the regulatory  regime hinges primarily on how the
government  exercises  both functions.
IH.5 Summary
Our assessment  of the regulatory  regimes in the sample countries  can best be
illustrated by the cases of Chile and the Philippines.  Chile awarded the franchise to the
private  sector through an international bidding, included provisions in the regulation to
revoke the license if the firm did not meet agreed targets, and introduced  benchmark
pricing.  It provided firms with explicit conflict resolution mechanisms,  allocated the
enforcement  of the regulation to multiple agencies, many of which  are reputed  for
independence.  It also enacted the regulation in a telecommunications  law, which is difficult
to change  without a serious debate, given the split in congress and ruling by minority.  In
contrast, the Philippines failed to utilize any of the information extracting mechanisms  and
only provided the operator with a ceiling of a 12 % rate of return on assets.  The
Philippines  also failed to resolve the commitment problem.  Although disputes  are referred
to the court system, the regulatory  rules are not  stated explicitly, the enforcing agencies  do
not have clear mandates,  and the judiciary  is weakened by the influence of the president  onGala] & Nauriyal  18
appointing judges.  PLDT substituted this lack of commitment by making political
affiliations to protect  itself.
Our assessment  of the regulatory  regimes in the remaining countries  suggests that
they only succeeded  in resolving some problems but not others.  On the one hand,  Jamaica
found a credible commitment mechanism to insulate the regulation from  political  changes
by embodying the regulation in an explicit license and allowing appeals to the
Commonwealth  Council in London.  However, it failed to introduce competition  even in
value added services and followed rate of return regulation, which gives limited incentive  to
the firm to operate  efficiently.  On the other hand, Mexico, Argentina  and Venezuela all
succeeded  in ameliorating the information asymmetry problem  and adopted cost  saving
pricing  schemes (RPI-X).  However, they regulated  by decree, leaving  conflict resolutions
ill defined and the concerned minister with too much discretion.  To the extent that
presidential  decrees can be reversed, this undermines the credibility  of safeguarding against
opportunistic  behavior  on the part of successive governments.  Although  reputation and
concern  for the success of economic reform may mitigate the negative effect of this
arrangement,  the long term effect remains uncertain.
Finally,  Malaysia's  regulatory regime  is still evolving, perhaps  because the private
sector only owns 25 percent  of the company.
IV. OUTCOMES:  COMPARATIVE  RESULTS
The ultimate test of the efficacy of the adopted regulatory regimes  lies in the impact
they have on performance.  To explore whether our assessment  of the regulatory  regimes
correspond  to outcomes or not, we compared the performance  of the sector before and after
the regulatory  reforms  in the seven countries.  We used the following indicators to  assess
performance:  network  growth, labor productivity, rates of return to the producers,  and
several measures  of consumer satisfaction.  The results are broadly consistent with  our
assessment  of the regulatory  regimes.
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Table  6 reports the average growth rates for network  expansion as well as labor
productivity  before and after reform.  Thanks to increased investment,  the network
expanded dramatically  in the post reform period in all countries, except  the Philippines  and
Malaysia.  This pattern is consistent with our analysis of the extent to which countries
resolved  the commitment  problem.  In particular, it is consistent with our conclusion that
Chile and Jamaica were the most successful countries  in resolving the commitment
problem,  while the Philippines and Malaysia were the least successful.
Table 6.  Network expansion and labor productivity before and after reform
(average annual growth rates,  and lines per worker, respectively)
Country  Period  Network  Expansion'  Labor Productivity
Pre-ref.  Post-ref.  Pre-ref.  Post-ref.  Pre-ref.  Post-ref.
Argentina  1981-90  1991-92  5.3  9.4  58  96
Chile  1981-86  1987-92  7.5  14.3  48  81
Jamaica  1981-87  1988-92  6.2  18.8  35  26
Malaysia  1981-86  1987-92  17.6  12.3  26  54
Mexico  1981-89  1990-92  7.0  12.8  95  122
Philippines  1980-85  1986-92  7.2  4.9  35  36
Venezuela  1981-90  1991-93  6.5  11.8  68  83
a. The pre-reform/post-reform  periods for which data are reported are:  Argentina:1981-90/1991-92;  Chile: 1981-86/
1987-92;  Jamaica: 1981-87/1988-92;  Malaysia: 1981-86/1987-92;  Mexico: 1981-89/1990-92;  Philippines:  1980-85/
1986-92;  and Venezuela:  1981-90/1991-93.
Source: International  Telecommunications  Union,  several editions.
Table 6 also  shows a marked improvement in labor productivity,  especially in
Argentina,  Chile, Mexico and Venezuela.  These are the countries which adopted  efficiency
inducing pricing  regimes (RPI-X or benchmark  regulation).  In contrast,  labor productivity
either  declined or showed negligible improvement in Jamaica and the Philippines, the only
countries  in the sample which adopted rate of return regulation.
IV.2 Returns  to capital and impact on consumers
Table 7 reports the average (after tax) rates of return on net worth before and  after
reform in the sample countries.  Net worth is used as a denominator rather  than revalued
assets because reliable data on the latter were not available.  The table clearly indicates that
all producers  did better  after reforn.  However, there is a large variance around the mean.Galal & Nauriyal  20
On the one hand, the Philippines's  telecom sector reportedly  makes the highest  rate of
return, which is consistent with the notion that the country did not successfully resolve  the
information,  pricing or the commitment problems.  On the other hand, the sector made the
lowest  rates of return in Argentina and Chile.  The Chilean case is easier to explain  because
it is the country which we judged  to have reasonably  resolved the three regulatory
problems.  In Argentina,  the explanation  may reside with the existence of two  suppliers of
the service, which  may have enabled the regulators to extract more information.
Table  7. Returns on net worth before  and after reform, (percent  annual averages)
Country  Pre-reform  Period  Post-reform  Period
Argentina  -5.7  1985-88  7.7  1991-93
Chile  6.7  1983-86  13.8  1987-91
Jamaica  13.5  1982-87  20.5  1988-91
Malaysia  --  1982-86  14.0  1987-92
Mexico  9.5  1982-89  22.4b  1990-93
Philippines  15.5  1980-85  25.7  1986-91
Venezuela  -10.9  1986-89  21.7  1991-93
-- information not available.
a. Profit before taxes over net worth  for 1990  only.
b. Estimate  based on World Bank projections  of revenues  and expenses  for TELMEX.
Sources: Hill and Abdala  (1994); Galal (1994); Spiller and Sampson  (1993); World Bank
(1993, 1990); Wellenius  et. al (1994); Esfahani  (1994); Clemente  (1994).
From the perspective of the consumers, they undoubtedly benefitted  from
expansion  (especially in Chile, Argentina,  Jamaica, Mexico and Venezuela),  as compared
with countries where  the rate of expansion fell (the Philippines  and Malaysia).  Not
surprisingly,  pending demand -- the ratio of applications for phone  service to phones
installed -- declined  in Argentina and Mexico and increased  in the Philippines  (table  8).
But pending demand also increased in Chile, Jamaica, and Venezuela, despite rapid growth
in the number of phone  lines; this is probably because, as the prospect of actually obtaining
a phone  improves, more people apply, so that the ratio of applicants to phones  initially
surges.  Thus, the two countries with the highest pending demand (the Philippines  with  79
percent,  and Jamaica with  81 percent) have very different  stories to tell: slow system
growth in the Philippines;  rapid growth in Jamaica.Galal & Nauriyal  21
Table  8. Quality of service  indicators,  before  and after reform.
% of Unsuccessful  Calls  Average  pending  demand'  (%)
Country  A  Year  B  Year  A  Period  B  Period
Argentina  19  1990  13  1992  32  1981-90  10  1991-92
Chile  --  --  1  1992  33  1981-86  35  1987-92
Jamaica  --  --  --  --  72  1986-87b  81  1989-92
Malaysia  --  --  - --  24  1981-86  7  1987-92
Mexico  I1  1988  9  1992  22  1981-89  16  1990-92
Philippines  --  --  18  1992  46  1980-85  79  1986-92
Venezuela  43  1990  37  1992  25  1981-90  35  1991-93
For each indicator column  A refers  to pre reform and column  B to post reform; -- Information not  available.
a. Ratio  of waiting  list to  main lines in operation.
b. No  information was available for  1981-85.
Source: Intemational  Telecommunications  Union (various  issues).
Besides benefitting  from expansion in the system,  consumers in all countries  for
which  we have data also benefitted  from better service, as indicated by improvements  in the
call completion rate (table  8).  But levels of quality varied widely; in particular the sharp
contrast between Chile and the Philippines persists;  in 1992 only  1 percent  of the calls were
unsuccessful  in Chile, while in the Philippines  37 percent of the calls were unsuccessful.
With respect to prices, this is one area where compiling comparable  data proved to
be the most  difficult.  Even where it was feasible to distinguish calls by customers  and peak
and  off peak periods, apportioning  fixed costs to different services and exchange  rate
manipulations  reduced the value and comparability of the data.  Accordingly,  we found  it
useful to simply estimate the changes in consumer surplus using real revenue per  line as a
proxy for the price and the number of operating lines as a proxy for quantity.  The changes
in consumer surplus are then approximated using Slutsky compensation. 12  To facilitate
inter country comparisons,  we normalized the average annual  changes in consumer  surplus
by the sector's  corresponding  average annual revenues.  The results  are reported  in table 9,
which  shows that consumers  were better off in Argentina, Chile and Jamaica.  They were
worse off in the remaining countries,  especially in Mexico, Venezuela, and the Philippines.
12  According to  Slutsky's  compensation, changes in real consumer surplus  in year t  are estimated as (P, - Pt.,).Q,, where, P is the real
price and Q is the quantity sold.Galal & Nauriyal  22
Table 9. Real Changes in Consumer  Surplus
(average annual  changes in consumer surplus relative to sector's  average  annual revenues)
Country  Pre-reform  Period  Post-reform  Period
Argentina  -7.1  1981-90  -4.7  1991-92
Chile  0.4  1981-86  0.5  1987-92
Jamaica  -13.4  1981-87  8.1  1988-92
Malaysia  4.2  1982-86  1.8  1987-92
Mexico  1.1  1982-89  -13.2  1990-92
Philippines  0.0  1980-85  -5.1  1986-91
Venezuela  10.4  1986-89  -7.8  1991-93
Source: Calculated from data from Intemational Telecommunications Union (various editions).
IV.3 Adding  it all up
We focused so far on linking the changes in outcomes with the success or failure
in resolving the three regulatory problems  identified at the outset.  The question remains,
however, as to whether the net welfare effect of reforms  has been positive  or negative.  The
answer obviously  depends on whether the changes in producer and consumer  surplus move
in the same or opposite directions.  In cases where the producers and  consumers were  both
better off after reform, it is possible to  declare the regulatory  reforms and privatization  a
success.  This conclusion  holds for Chile, Argentina  and Jamaica.  The same conclusion  can
not be drawn, however,  in cases where the producers  were better off but not the consumers,
as in Malaysia, Mexico, Venezuela and the Philippines.  The net effect of reform in these
cases depends on the magnitude of the gains and losses and the weights  attached to each.
It also depends  on whether the reform led to more investment, higher  efficiency and better
pricing, or not.
With respect to Mexico, a comprehensive evaluation of the welfare effects _of
privatizing TELMEX  is available (Galal et al., 1994).  The conclusion of this evaluation  is
that the privatization of the company was welfare improving, thanks to improved
productivity and more efficient pricing policy.  While we cannot draw such a conclusion  for
Malaysia  and Venezuela,  it seems reasonable to conclude that the reform in the Philippines
has not been welfare improving, given that investment declined and productivity  remainedGalal & Nauriyal  23
stagnant after reforms.  In other words, there has been no increase  in the welfare pie to
create the possibility  of making someone better off without making anyone else worse off.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A useful  understanding of regulation should both help us explain and predict  the
behavior  of regulated firms and the regulators as well as the results  emerging therefrom.  In
this  paper, we drew on the recent  contracting literature in an attempt to link the
performance  of the telecom sector with the extent to which  seven developing  countries
successfully resolved the information asymmetry,  pricing and commitment problems.
Although  our sample is small and not random, our findings  are generally consistent  with the
predictions  of this  literature.  On the one hand, Chile was able to reasonably  resolve all
three problems, leading  to higher private sector investment, reasonable  rates of return to the
producers  and improvements  in consumer satisfaction.  On the other hand, the Philippines
failed to reasonably  resolve all three problems, leading to disappointing  performance.  The
analysis of the remaining five countries shows a mixture.  For example, Jamaica resolved
the commitment  problem but fell short in resolving the information and pricing problems.
The results  were  also mixed: investment increased  but in combination  with relatively  high
rates of return to the producers.  At the other end of the scale, Venezuela reasonably
resolved the information and pricing problems, but fell short on commitment.  As a result,
the private  sector is making  excessive rates of return but at the expense of the consumers.
These findings generate a number of policy implications.  First, successful
regulatory  design has to address the information asymmetry, pricing and commitment
problems simultaneously.  Resolving one problem without the others can lead to under
investment or excessive rates of return to the producers at the expense of consumers.
Second, while resolving the commitment problem requires devising clear  conflict
resolution  mechanisms,  enforcing the regulation at reasonable costs, and insulating
regulation  from arbitrary changes caused by political turnovers,  the actual implementation
of these principles  in a given context  requires an understanding  of the history and
prevailing political  and judicial  institutions  in each country.Gaul & Nauriya  24
Third, compromises and attention  to details are vital in resolving the information,
pricing and commitment  problems. Or, as often put, the devil is in the details.  To give but
one example, where a country is unable to commit credibly because it does not have
appropriate neutral enforcing agencies, it would not be appropriate to leave the X factor in
price cap undetermined. Failing this, private investment may not be forthcoming.GalIa  & Nriryul  25
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